

A Special Report

THE GULF CRISIS

Finding a
Peaceful Solution



UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

November 1990



I am pleased to provide you with a complimentary copy of *The Gulf Crisis: Finding a Peaceful Solution*. In order to disseminate this Special Report as quickly as possible, we have produced it in a simple format.

The Special Report derives from panel discussions at the Institute's conference last month on "Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Third World." The panelists were experts in many different areas, including traditional diplomacy, international law and the United Nations, behavioral studies, negotiation theory and training, and strategic planning. They were asked to comment as if they were responding to a request from the President for advice on how to maximize the chances of achieving a peaceful solution to the crisis which satisfies basic American interests and U. N. Security Council resolutions.

The Institute's mandate is to help both government officials and the American public to understand better the complex nature of international conflict and peacemaking. We hope this report will be helpful to members of the Executive and Legislative branches and others who are grappling with how to achieve a satisfactory peaceful outcome of the Gulf crisis.

Please feel free to reproduce this Special Report for anyone you think may benefit from reading it; or, if you provide us their name and address, we would be delighted to send them a copy.

Your comments on this Special Report and its contents are welcome.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, which appears to read "Samuel W. Lewis". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial 'S'.

Samuel W. Lewis
President

The United States Institute of Peace

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, federal institution created and funded by Congress to strengthen the nation's capacity to promote the peaceful resolution of international conflict. Established in 1984, the Institute has its origins in the tradition of American statesmanship, which seeks to limit international violence and to achieve a just peace based on freedom and human dignity. The Institute meets its congressional mandate to expand available knowledge about ways to achieve a more peaceful world through an array of programs, including grantmaking, a three-tiered fellowship program, research and studies projects, development of library resources, and a variety of citizen education activities. The Institute is governed by a bipartisan, fifteen-member Board of Directors, including four members ex officio from the executive branch of the federal government and eleven individuals appointed from outside federal service by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

Board of Directors

John Norton Moore (Chairman), Walter L. Brown Professor of Law and Director of the Graduate Program, University of Virginia School of Law

Elsbeth Davies Rostow (Vice Chairman), Stiles Professor of American Studies Emerita, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas

Dennis L. Bark, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University

William R. Kintner, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

Evron M. Kirkpatrick, President, Helen Dwight Reid Educational Foundation, Washington

Morris I. Leibman, Esq., Sidley and Austin, Chicago

Sidney Lovett, retired United Church of Christ Minister, Holderness, N.H.

Richard John Neuhaus, Director, Institute on Religion and Public Life, New York

Mary Louise Smith, civic leader; former member, Board of Directors, Iowa Peace Institute

W. Scott Thompson, Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Allen Weinstein, President, Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C., and University Professor and Professor of History, Boston University

Members ex officio

J. A. Baldwin, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy, and President, National Defense University

Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy

Ronald F. Lehman II, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

Samuel W. Lewis, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

The Gulf Crisis

Finding a Peaceful Solution

A Special Report

United States Institute of Peace
Washington, D.C.

The views expressed in this book are those of the participants alone. They do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace.

United States Institute of Peace
1550 M Street, N.W., Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20005

Printed in the United States of America

Contents

Highlights	v
Participants	vii
Introduction	1
The Problem	1
Alternative Avenues	
Designing a Political Strategy	2
<i>Harold Saunders</i>	
Track-Two Diplomacy	4
<i>Jay Rothman</i>	
International Law and the United Nations	5
<i>Allan Gerson</i>	
The Realpolitik Approach	6
<i>Martin Indyk</i>	
Practical Restraints--Tests of Reality	
Saddam Hussein's Psychological Makeup	8
<i>Jerrold Post</i>	
Saddam and the Iraqi Elite	10
<i>Gholam Razi</i>	
Can Coercive Diplomacy Work?	11
<i>Alexander George</i>	
Conclusion	
<i>Samuel W. Lewis</i>	13
Appendix	
Next Steps for the UN in the Gulf	15
<i>Joseph P. Lorenz</i>	

Erratum

*The Gulf Crisis:
Finding a Peaceful Solution*

Page 16: In the first line of the second full paragraph,
"Arab/Israeli force" should read "Arab/Islamic force."

Highlights

The Problem

How to increase the chances of a peaceful settlement that meets UN Security Council demands and protects basic American interests in the Middle East.

The Adversary

"Not the mad man of the Middle East...highly predictable, within limits...a judicious political calculator, but dangerous in the extreme...a revolutionary pragmatist...able to reverse course, but culturally quite narrow, surrounded by sycophants who dare not criticize him, for good reason...not a martyr...uses time as a weapon...if he does back off it will be only a temporary deflection of his drive for ultimate power...most dangerous when he believes he has no way out...exhibits the most dangerous personality constellation: unbounded pride and self-exaltation, with little ability to understand the sufferings of others; unconstrained, ruthless use of aggression; absence of conscience; and a paranoid outlook--the constellation of an individual who only understands the role of force."--Jerrold Post

Alternative and Complementary Approaches

- Devote as much energy to developing a political strategy and a precise political scenario, with possible reciprocal moves, as to elaborating military options.
- Articulate a longer-term vision of a peaceful Middle East--communicate it to Saddam through third parties, then to publics at large.
- Make greater use of the UN Secretary General's good offices--and exhaust all peaceful remedies under the UN Charter before using force; preserve Security Council support to share responsibility for the outcome if force is required.

- Try to avoid "zero sum" and "us versus them" approaches; seek ways to reframe the conflict to focus on shared problems that might be overcome cooperatively.
- Meanwhile, however, make unmistakably credible preparations to use massive force, making clear to Saddam through all channels, especially the Soviet Union, our readiness to pay the price of using force if necessary.
- Give continually tightened collective sanctions (coercive diplomacy) ample time to demonstrate to Saddam that his best option is peaceful withdrawal and retention of his leadership position in Iraq.

A Few Tactical Suggestions

- Define the conflict publicly as the civilized world versus Saddam Hussein, *not* Bush versus Saddam.
- Initiate a serious move to expel Iraq from the United Nations under Article 5 of the charter if compliance with UN orders is not forthcoming.
- Leave Saddam with some potential window of exit involving face-saving devices--for example, do *not* press "war crimes" tribunal proposal.
- Avoid making premature negotiating offers; wait for Saddam to conclude that *he* must come forward with acceptable proposals of his own for face-saving gestures coupled to withdrawal.

Participants

Alexander George is a Jennings Randolph Distinguished Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. Before coming to the Institute, he was the Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University. An expert on coercive diplomacy, he is the author of numerous books and articles, including *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*.

Allan Gerson is an international lawyer and a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. From 1981 to 1985 he was counsel to the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, and from 1985 to 1986 he served as deputy assistant attorney general, with responsibilities in the national security field. He is the author of two books and a number of articles.

Martin Indyk is executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and an adjunct professor at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He has served as deputy director of current intelligence in the Australian Prime Minister's Office of National Assessments, and has published widely on international relations.

Samuel W. Lewis has been president of the United States Institute of Peace since 1987. As U.S. ambassador to Israel from 1977 to 1985, he was a prominent actor in the Camp David conference and the negotiations for the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

Joseph P. Lorenz is a retired senior foreign service officer whose thirty years of diplomatic service centered on the Middle East and UN political affairs. Among other duties, he has been responsible for Middle Eastern affairs at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. He is the author of two books.

Jerrold Post is a professor of psychiatry, political psychology, and international affairs at George Washington University and the founder of the Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior, an interdisciplinary behavioral science unit that provided assessments of foreign leadership and decisionmaking for the President and other senior officials.

Gholam H. Razi is currently a visiting professor of Middle Eastern studies at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Ala. He is on leave from the University of Houston, where he teaches comparative politics, international relations, and Middle Eastern political systems. He has written numerous articles on the Persian Gulf.

Jay Rothman teaches at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He has conducted numerous training workshops on ways to overcome Arab-Israeli hostility and specializes in the study of "track-two," or supplemental, diplomacy.

Harold Saunders is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution. He served for many years on the National Security Council staff and in the Department of State, including two years as assistant secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs. He played key roles in the negotiation of three Arab-Israeli disengagement agreements, the Camp David accords and peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, and the release of American hostages in Tehran.

Introduction

Since Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, there has been much debate on whether the United States should go to war and, if so, what would be the best way to destroy the Iraqi regime. There has been much less discussion, in public at least, about finding ways to achieve a satisfactory outcome without going to war.

To explore the "peace option," the United States Institute of Peace assembled a wide-ranging panel of former government officials, policymakers, and scholars on October 5, 1990, to discuss "The Gulf Crisis: Finding a Peaceful Solution." The panel discussion was but one session of a larger conference sponsored by the Institute on "Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Third World." This report summarizes the panel discussion and also contains a complementary paper by Joseph Lorenz on "Next Steps for the UN in the Gulf" that is drawn from his presentation at another conference session on "A New Role for the United Nations in Third World Conflict Resolution."

The Problem

As a basis for the panel discussion, Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis, president of the United States Institute of Peace and moderator of the panel, stipulated the following hypothetical premise: The next two months would see no major change in the uneasy stalemate in the Gulf, and a continuation of the international sanctions. Since the human, political, and diplomatic costs of war would probably be high (some military specialists estimate 25,000 U.S. casualties in the first three or four weeks), the United States should first explore every means to achieve an acceptable peaceful outcome. "I'm sure that President Bush wants to avoid war, if at all possible," added Lewis. "War is a last resort for a democracy, not a choice to be taken lightly."

"How then," Lewis asked the panelists, "during the next two months, would your particular approach to peace-making increase the chances of a peaceful settlement that meets UN Security Council demands and protects basic American interests?"

Alternative Avenues

Designing a Political Strategy

Responding first was Harold Saunders, former assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs in the Carter administration and a long-time government official. Saunders drew on his experience as a key official participant in the Kissinger shuttle agreements, the Camp David Accords, and the Iranian hostage negotiations to articulate a new model for today's world. According to Saunders, the old power politics model would have offered President Bush only an ultimate choice between war and formal negotiation. In today's world, however, relations among nations take place within a political process of continuous interaction among whole bodies politic, not just among governments. This more realistic model opens up between war and formal negotiation a large field of possibilities for political settlement.

Saunders endorsed the firm position taken by the U.S. government: Iraq must withdraw, Iraq must not be rewarded for what it has done, and the sovereignty of Kuwait must be restored. He added that the diplomatic structure had already been put in place—including the building of international support, establishment of a quarantine, military deployment, and communication through third-party channels. Traditionally, "you marshal power against the adversary and you wait for the adversary to blink."

Saunders urged, however, that the United States now "give every bit as much energy to developing a political scenario as it is giving to developing the military option." But how would one develop that scenario? First, one would utilize the techniques of "track-two" or unofficial, supplemental diplomacy (see p. 4) and make an in-depth analysis of what Saddam really needs—why did he get into this situation, and what does he need to back off?

Then, the President should consider "painting a verbal picture" of what the Middle East could look like after the crisis is over. This picture would obviously include a sovereign Kuwait, but it would also pay some attention to the concerns of the have-nots in the Middle East, to the injustices of the past, and to the other ongoing conflicts in the region. The picture would not include the obliteration of Iraq or the total removal of the present Iraqi regime, but would envision a regional security structure designed to prevent future aggression. "In any case, one way or another, through a speech,

through private messages, or whatever, it would be desirable for the President to put on the table an alternative to total capitulation," said Saunders.

Second, the United States needs to communicate this vision of the future to those who are engaged in political dialogue with the Iraqis--the Soviets, the French, other Arab nations--and it needs to make clear that this vision is a viable alternative to the military option, provided the basic requirements are met: withdrawal without reward, and restoration of the sovereignty of Kuwait.

Saunders acknowledged that people who speak about political settlement are often accused of being "wimps" and of capitulating. "There will be an argument that even letting anybody know that you're willing to think about these things will be taken as a sign of weakness," admitted Saunders. "That is a danger, and that's why I would put these communications in the hands of third parties."

Once the U.S. vision has been articulated, it might be possible to develop a more precise scenario, made available to an intermediary, where symbolic moves by one side, such as pulling out some military units, would be reciprocated by the other. "What I have done here is to suggest a way of starting the process of building a political scenario. We would not have resolved the crisis in two months but we might have defined the beginnings of a scenario where one move reinforces another so that you could begin the process of winding down." That would provide the President with an option of deferring to use force from December to perhaps March, with some confidence.

Citing the Cuban missile crisis as an example of traditional power politics, and a case in which Khrushchev "blinked," Saunders asked, "Do we wait for Saddam to blink, or by using a variety of approaches discussed here, do we create an environment in which nobody really has to blink, but the essence of blinking occurs on both sides?"

"I would submit that there is an honorable way out here and that ways can be found to structure security in the Middle East through other means that will contain this source of aggression over time."

Track-Two Diplomacy

Following up on Saunders' comment about "track-two" diplomacy, Professor Jay Rothman described how unofficial, supplemental diplomacy might contribute to the chances of a peaceful outcome of the Gulf crisis.

Rothman, an experienced trainer and a teacher at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, defined conflict resolution as two sets of related activities: conflict analysis or framing--the way we define or understand the conflict and the underlying motivations and objectives of the parties; and cooperative problem-solving and option-generation. "Conflict resolution attempts to help the parties move away from 'zero-sum' and 'us-versus-them' definitions of the conflict," to move the discussion away from blaming and demonization and to identify both sides' concerns and motivations in inclusive terms.

According to Rothman, if we reframe the situation and expand our understanding, we might also expand our range of potential action. "The way we think affects the way we act; the way we frame affects the way we develop policy. Therefore we need to ask questions such as, 'Why do millions of Arabs support Saddam? Why do the Arabs hate the West so much? And what are the needs that, if frustrated, will continue to breed hostility and violence and continue to generate Khomeinis and Saddams in the future?' " Asking these questions might allow the United States to reframe the conflict in such a way that we could define shared problems that could be overcome cooperatively.

Taking this approach does not mean the United States must accept Saddam's argument that the Arab-Israeli conflict is the core conflict, and the Gulf crisis is just a piece of the larger conflict. The immediate Gulf crisis, says Rothman, grew out of the irresponsible acts of a power-hungry leader. Nevertheless, it is important to understand the conditions that gave rise to Saddam and to his widespread support among the Arab masses.

So how do we move from framing to problem-solving? One approach is track-two, or supplemental, diplomacy, in which high-level diplomats, advisers, policymakers, and other leaders are brought together in private, unofficial settings. First, the participants should be drawn from all the parties to the conflict. Second, the meetings should be secret and therefore deniable. Third, the sessions should be guided by third-party facilitators. The objectives would be to set a new agenda for the Middle East process in general and the Gulf crisis in particular, and to design intermediate steps for such processes as confidence-building measures, face-saving options, and long-term

development diplomacy. (It should be emphasized here that track-two diplomacy is meant to enhance the traditional or "track-one" approach, not to replace it.)

Rothman cautioned that the kinds of meetings he is suggesting may not be of much use in the heat of the current crisis. This type of interactive problem-solving is "no longer or not yet the ideal instrument to gain new insights and convert them into a new policy for peace." But we nonetheless have much to gain from undertaking this kind of analysis unilaterally, he says. "We hear about the plans and strategies that our military has for waging war. We need to much more fully develop our plans and strategies for waging peace, and we need to place a great deal more emphasis on understanding the underlying conditions and causes of the conflict." Furthermore, even after this crisis is settled, "the deeper conflict between cultures, histories, values, and objectives will remain. Conflict resolution and track-two diplomacy might help us manage these differences more creatively and more peacefully in the future."

Concluded Rothman, "Winning and losing in the Middle East needs to be thought about in a very different way. There will be no winners if there are any losers. The amount of loss on all sides will be phenomenal.... We need to be thinking about ways to reframe the conflict from us versus them...to 'let's try to get out of it together.' I don't say this can be done without coercive threats, but we need also to communicate that we are ready to find creative ways to deal with historic inequities as well."

International Law and the United Nations

International lawyer Allan Gerson offered a somewhat different approach to the Gulf crisis, but one that he felt could be integrated with the two discussed previously. Drawing on Article 51 of the UN Charter, he would urge the President to "formally take the position that individual nations have a concurrent right to undertake whatever military action is appropriate in order to remedy an armed attack until such time as the UN Security Council is able to act." He went on to say, however, that there were a number of peaceful remedies under the UN Charter that should be fully exhausted before any military action is taken.

The first option, discussed in Article 33 of the UN Charter, deals with seeking a solution by negotiation, mediation, arbitration, or judicial

settlement. In particular, the United States should urge the UN secretary general to intensify efforts to use his good offices to mediate the crisis.

A second avenue, spelled out in Articles 41 and 5, would lead to severance of diplomatic relations and the expulsion of Iraq from the United Nations. This action would "put Saddam on notice that he is considered by the international community to be an international outlaw," and that further collective steps could lead to joint military action by the United Nations. Furthermore, it should be possible to develop a mechanism for making American forces available to a UN command under Article 43 while concurrently maintaining U.S. forces under American operational command, said Gerson. At the very least, the United States should send a signal that it is willing to work seriously with the UN military staff committee, as provided for under Article 46 of the charter.

Finally, Gerson argued that the United States should explore, cautiously, the possibility of involving the International Court of Justice in some way, possibly under Article 96. Acknowledging the risk in this approach, he noted that it might nevertheless be possible to use the new procedures whereby the court breaks up into small chambers for which the judges are selected by both parties, much in the same way that one selects arbiters.

In sum, Gerson urged the U.S. government to exhaust all peaceful remedies provided for in the UN charter. "Then, if all of these measures fail, the United States would certainly be in a better position legally and politically if it should choose,...as a last resort, the use of military force."

The Realpolitik Approach

"If you want to avoid war, you have to be prepared to go to war. You have to be prepared to threaten war in such a credible way that war then becomes unnecessary for the achievement of your objectives. That is the heart of the realpolitik approach," says Martin Indyk, executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "Its starting point is the assumption that it's a nasty world out there, a world in which power and the threat or use of force are the principal means of interaction among states."

Indyk described Saddam's invasion of Kuwait as "a classic act of the jungle. He didn't go into Kuwait to liberate Palestine...or to take care of the have-nots in the Middle East." Iraq had only recently finished an eight-year war against its neighbor, Iran, and had used chemical weapons against its own

Kurdish population. The only language that Saddam understands, concluded Indyk, is the language of force.

How then do we achieve our objective--the total and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate government--without the use of force? We must make it clear to Saddam that he has to get out or the alternatives will be far worse. Anything short of his capitulation, anything that rewards him or allows him to save face, enables him to emerge looking like a winner. And if that happens, and he keeps his military capabilities, "he'll be back again, next time with his nuclear arsenal."

Such a strategy of "coalition compellance" is extremely difficult to make succeed, especially when the goal is to *reverse* the status quo, not just deter an attack. Success depends on the ability of the international community to produce a prolonged impression of combined resolve, continued Indyk, and on Saddam's ability to receive that message. "His calculation is...that he can wait us out." The first problem with such a strategy concerns the confusing mixed signals coming from our allies, Congress, and even the Bush administration. The second problem is the issue of carrots and sticks. Our threat to use force may look less dangerous to Saddam than the threat of his overthrow should he retreat. On the other hand, any suggestion from us that would make withdrawal more attractive for him could produce the opposite effect by making him believe that he can, in fact, wait us out.

The United States needs to make credible preparations and threaten force and prepare to use force at the same time as it pursues other approaches. We should tighten the blockade, and we should find a way to send a clearer signal to Saddam, perhaps by using intermediaries. We should deploy our forces in different ways, perhaps mobilizing forces in Turkey to suggest that Iraq might face a two-front war. And finally, at some point, we have to issue an ultimatum, "Get out or else." If we are not prepared to threaten the use of force, Saddam is not going to listen to us--though we should be aware that there are many other problems associated with ultimata.

Indyk concluded by offering what he described as an alternative approach, based on a change in U.S. *objectives*. This would shift from the goal of forcing Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait to a goal of making him pay such a high price for remaining that it would eventually become too costly. The means would include tightening sanctions further, while holding the international coalition intact, so as to weaken Iraq's military machine and its economy and

to increase Iraq's isolation. This "containment" option, necessarily prolonged, would also raise manifold problems—including the difficulty of keeping the coalition together and the perception that Saddam had achieved at least a short-term victory by forcing a shift in U.S. strategy.

In sum, said Indyk, "We don't have an easy way to get him out of Kuwait without going to war. But if we are not prepared to threaten the use of force, given the nature of Saddam Hussein and his regime, he's not going to listen to us.... We have to choose between bad options.... How we choose depends on what price we're prepared to pay and what kind of objectives must be achieved."

Practical Restraints--Tests of Reality

Saddam Hussein's Psychological Makeup

"This is one of those unique moments in history where leader personality and political behavior are of crucial significance," stated Jerrold Post, professor of psychiatry and international relations at George Washington University. Accordingly, the characterization of Saddam as "the mad man of the Middle East" is not only inaccurate but highly dangerous, because it encourages policymakers to think of him as unpredictable and not understandable.

"In fact, Saddam is both highly predictable, within limits, and highly understandable. He is first and foremost a judicious political calculator. He is dangerous in the extreme but he is by no means irrational."

Post went on to summarize some salient points of Saddam's career and personality. As a young man, Saddam was imbued with Baathist ideology, which emphasized that the oppression and divisiveness within the Arab world was caused by outsiders. The Baathist goal was to achieve Pan-Arab unity under a single strong leader and to expel the outsiders. To pursue this goal, Saddam has been willing throughout his career to justify the most extreme actions. Moreover, in his mind the goals of Saddam and of Iraq are indistinguishable.

Furthermore, the only loyalty Saddam has is to Saddam himself. No matter how loyal an individual has been, no matter how supportive a nation has been--circumstances change. When and if they do, so can Saddam's loyalties. Moreover, Saddam is a "revolutionary" pragmatist. On numerous

occasions he has been willing to reverse course when a decision proved counterproductive--as, for example, in yielding all the hard-won Iranian territory to conclude the recent peace treaty with Iran. "Never is a short time when revolutionary pragmatism dictates," noted Post.

Although Saddam is not crazy, he is often out of touch with political reality, and this has led him to make major miscalculations in the past. There are two main reasons: first, he is culturally quite narrow, having been out of the Middle East on only two brief occasions; second, he is surrounded by sycophants who dare not criticize him, and for good reason--to disagree is to risk death. In fact, Saddam exhibits the four characteristics of the most dangerous personality constellation: unbounded self-exaltation, with little ability to understand the feelings or sufferings of others; readiness to use unconstrained aggression to achieve his ends; absence of conscience; and a paranoid outlook. "He regularly sees himself as the victim of others and his aggression is required to defend himself against his outside enemies.... It is, indeed, the constellation of an individual who only understands the role of force," said Post.

Saddam sees himself as destined for the pantheon of great world leaders, but he is not a martyr. He has shown the ability to back off, especially if he can retain his power and dignity. He is most dangerous when he believes he has no way out. He also knows how to use time as a weapon. This is an especially important point, since it is estimated that Iraq is within five years of nuclear weapons capability. The United States and its allies need to think beyond the current crisis and to seriously consider how to contain this future threat. Post added that, if Saddam is blocked in his open aggression, he can assuredly be expected to covertly support increased international terrorism.

Post strongly supported Gerson's recommendation (see p. 6) that expelling Iraq from the United Nations, and therefore Saddam from the rank of legitimate world leaders, would have a powerful psychological impact on him. "He needs to be at the center of power, and he craves international respect." Post was highly skeptical, however--as were all other panel members--about the wisdom of threatening Saddam with a "war crimes" trial, a course calculated to drive him irrevocably into a corner without any apparent exit.

Post believes it is also extremely important that U.S. officials describe the Gulf conflict in terms of the civilized world versus Saddam, not the civilized

world versus Iraq (that is, the Iraqi people) or the United States versus Iraq, or worse, the United States versus Iraq and the Arab world. In particular, Post stressed, it is a mistake for President Bush to personalize the argument with Saddam, because that allows Saddam to appear to the Arabs as a strong leader who is willing to stand up bravely against the President of the world's greatest power.

Saddam and the Iraqi Elite

Air War College visiting professor Gholam Razi presented a somewhat different perspective, based on his in-depth study of the Iran-Iraq War and the role of Iraqi and Iranian elites. Razi argued that Americans have only a partial vision of reality when it comes to the Middle East, and that that partial vision, which is conditioned by our Western culture, distorts our policy toward the region.

For example, he contended that both Iran and Iraq were losers in that war, no matter who was the nominal winner. Furthermore, he argued that Iran was as much, if not more, responsible for starting the war as Iraq, noting that Khomeini rejected Saddam's initial offers of friendship, and that Iran began to interfere in Iraq's internal affairs, including efforts to overthrow Saddam, soon after the revolution.

Razi went on to argue that the realpolitik approach dealt with only a part of reality because it focused largely on external relations. Foreign policy is typically decided by a few people, especially in the Middle East. To understand it, you must study the elite.

"You must be able to place yourself in their position and know as much as possible about their motivations and the types of information they have." Only then will you be able to understand how they will behave in case of war.

Referring in particular to Saddam, Razi noted that the Iraqi leader's background was, "to some extent, the product of what we call Western European colonialism. After all, Iraq was under the domination of Britain" for many years. In addition, Saddam was involved in revolutionary activities at an early stage of his life. So Saddam does indeed believe in force, but his theory of international relations is very Western—he is a student of the writings of Machiavelli and Hans Morgenthau. "If you look at the recent past in Iraq, there has been a great deal of industrialization, development of infrastructure, education—all along Western lines," noted Razi.

While largely agreeing with Jerrold Post (see p. 8), Razi stressed that Saddam's real aim is the pursuit of power, and his larger goal is Arab unity based on secularism. "He is not a religious person, although he will make compromises with religion. He will also make compromises with the West, when necessary. But while he will compromise, he will not abandon his basic objectives. And if he's cornered too badly, he may attack our forces. He believes the West's primary goal is to dominate the Arab world, and he's very, very suspicious of our claims to morality when he sees what's happening in the West Bank now. That reinforces his position that for the West, morality is an instrument for increasing power. He doesn't know anything about the workings of Western democracy."

Can Coercive Diplomacy Work?

Alexander George, a former professor of international relations at Stanford University, summed up his recommendations by saying, "I agree with much of what my good friend Harold Saunders says, but, really there is no basic disagreement between the political scenario he has rightly emphasized and the very sober, realistic approach put forth by Martin Indyk. I would strongly advise President Bush to resist the temptations and pressures to go to major military escalation, and I would urge the President to resist the pressures to convert the present 'try and see' version of coercive diplomacy, which rests on the sanctions effort, into an ultimatum. There are all kinds of booby traps, uncertainties, and risks connected with an ultimatum.

"The best option we have is to pursue the present course of action, and make it more effective over a longer period of time. This approach is our best hope for achieving an acceptable settlement without having to pay the terrible price of military escalation"--which actually should be referred to by its proper term: "preventive war."

George argued further that President Bush already had a major achievement--the development of the UN Security Council as a viable force in world affairs. "This is a long-range payoff from the crisis that no one expected, and President Bush deserves a great deal of credit for having brought it about." It should therefore be a major objective of U.S. policy to preserve the viability of the new Security Council that is emerging. Doing that, however, means that the United States should not engage in any action in the crisis that does not have the explicit prior support of the Security

Council. Of course, that will be a major constraint on what the President can do, but if the United States manages to retain the support of the Security Council, "the responsibility for the outcome, however mixed, will be shared with the Security Council. And we'll have the Security Council to help deal with the aftermath once the crisis is over. I regard this as a very important objective."

George stressed that "we do not want to end up with a military victory in the Gulf that creates as many problems, if not more, than it solves. We don't want to be isolated after this crisis is over." Making full use of the United Nations offers us the opportunity to move in the direction of a new world order that would substitute for the outdated Cold War structure.

George noted that coercive diplomacy is a very flexible strategy but it is also a very beguiling strategy because "it promises to give you your objectives on the cheap, without bloodshed. That's fine if it works, as it did in the Cuban missile crisis. But each situation is different, and the Gulf crisis strains enormously the capability of coercive diplomacy to achieve an acceptable settlement without major warfare." That is because the current conflict is "very close to a zero-sum game, which was not the case in the Cuban missile crisis, and it's very difficult to see how reliance on carrots is going to take us very far. I don't think there's any way to get an acceptable settlement without continued pressure. My preference, however, is that the pressure should remain at the level of sanctions. It's possible to think of ten different scenarios that lead to terrible outcomes, but very hard to think of one scenario that leads to an acceptable solution without major war. We should be patient and wait for the sanctions to work well enough that Saddam is motivated to seek a way out."

George agreed that it is important to leave an opponent with some exit from the crisis that is compatible with face-saving, to indicate a generalized willingness to accept some diplomatic outcome. Yet he urged waiting for Saddam to conclude that *he* must come up with proposals of his own for acceptable face-savers, and not come forward prematurely with proposals of our own. Only thus will we know that sanctions are effectively influencing his choices.

Conclusion

Moderator Samuel Lewis drew the panel to a close by restating the purpose of the session. "In this discussion, we have tried to give our audience an example of how scholars and policymakers can usefully interact in analyzing a serious international crisis. We have tried to follow Harold Saunders' lead in asking, 'What should the United States do tomorrow?' and 'How does it fit into a longer-range strategy?' "

Lewis then commented on several points made by the participants. "Something that hasn't been stressed enough is how difficult it is to design a scenario for a 30-nation coalition and have any hope that it will be implemented in a consistent fashion. Martin Indyk's emphasis on the 'static' that interferes with clear signaling of our intentions cannot be underscored enough. On the other hand, ambiguity can also be an important diplomatic weapon. I rather doubt that it would be a good idea, as Allan Gerson suggested, for the President to reach a firm, *public* conclusion about whether or not we have the right to use force without additional Security Council authorization. In fact, the very ambiguity of our current position, it seems to me, sends an important signal to Saddam that force is a possible option. And I agree with Indyk's proposition that a real threat of force has to be in the background if a political scenario is to have a chance of working.

"Finally, one thing I have concluded from this session is that Saddam is surely one of the toughest kinds of antagonists to deal with in an international crisis. We are particularly grateful to Jerrold Post and Gholam Razi for their comments on the character of the man we're dealing with. Nonetheless, difficult characters also have to make difficult choices. And what we've been talking about here are ways to make his choices ultimately compatible with the international community's essential needs, without sacrificing many thousands of lives.

"While we haven't found the precise answer here this morning, our panelists have contributed some provocative ideas from which a strategy for a peaceful settlement could perhaps be constructed. For that, we are in their debt."

Appendix

Next Steps for the UN in the Gulf

by Joseph P. Lorenz

In the debate over where to go from here in getting Iraq out of Kuwait, it is generally thought that the United Nations has done its part—that the alternatives now are to wait for the sanctions to force Baghdad to move back to its frontiers or, if that takes too long, to drive Iraq out with the U.S.-led forces in the Gulf. In fact, the Security Council sanctions do not end the UN's usefulness. Rather, they lay the foundation for a third alternative that, by exploiting the new possibilities for international action that have opened since the Cold War, puts the strongest possible pressure on Iraq to withdraw and at the same time begins to deal with the long-term Iraqi threat to the region.

Three assumptions underlie the following ideas for a combination of great power collective security, UN peacekeeping, and border guarantees by the Security Council's five permanent members. The first is that any solution must provide not only for Iraq's withdrawal, the release of hostages, and the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait, but must also ensure against Iraqi aggression in the future. The second is that Baghdad has the resources to hold out against the sanctions longer than the United States—because of political and financial pressures—will be able to refrain from military action. And the third is that a U.S.-led strike would polarize the Arab world and lead to wider Middle East conflict, setting back the prospects for an Arab-Israeli settlement and a more stable world order.

The heart of the concept is to combine for the first time traditional UN peacekeeping and great power collective security. The collective security component would be a UN Persian Gulf force, consisting of the Security Council's permanent members and relying primarily on air and naval power. Deployed in and around the Gulf, the force would be capable of swift retaliation against Iraq in the face of further aggression or provocation. Its continuing presence would demonstrate the determination and capacity of the international community to keep the UN sanctions in place until Iraq withdraws to its borders. Baghdad would have lost the ability to exploit

differences in the Security Council over how long is long enough to wait for the sanctions to take effect.

The ground forces of the permanent members that are now in Saudi Arabia would, in this scenario, be drawn down gradually. They would be replaced by a UN peacekeeping force made up of a broad spectrum of Arab and Islamic states and, for operational effectiveness, a few countries with long peacekeeping experience like Canada and India. With this kind of composition, a defensive mandate, and the direction and command of the operation in the hands of the UN rather than Western nations, it should be possible to attract many of the Arab and Islamic countries that are culturally and politically closest to Iraq. Saddam Hussein would have lost his most rousing battle cries--that the war is between the rich and the poor, the imperialists and the oppressed, and atheists and the godly.

In one important respect, the Arab/Israeli force would depart from traditional UN practice, which has been to seek the consent of both parties to a peacekeeping operation. In this case Iraq's agreement would not be sought, as the purpose of the operation would not be to separate the belligerents but to deter further aggression. The force would thus represent a continuation of the mandatory measures that the Security Council has already taken under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.

The five-power collective security force would be linked to a permanent member guarantee of the borders of the Arab states and Israel. The concept of a great power guarantee is patterned on the Tripartite Declaration by Britain, France, and the United States of May 25, 1950, which helped to maintain peace in the Middle East for several years. In that declaration the three governments stated that "should they find that any of these States (the Arab states and Israel) was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines," they would "immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent any such violation." The pledge to take action "outside the United Nations," as well as within it, is a useful assurance of immediate great power action in the event of threatened aggression against Israel.

The object of these suggestions is to spread the responsibility and cost of the Gulf operation through the international community, which is where it belongs, and by reducing pressures for early military action, to give the sanctions time to take effect. With the burden shared in this way, the UN peacekeeping operation and the permanent member force could be kept in

place until the threat from Iraq had been removed. Far from being a departure from U.S. policy, the proposal extends that policy by continuing to make maximum use of the United Nations.

Eliminating the long-term threat from Iraq depends on the negotiation of a regional arms control agreement and, if possible, a Middle East zone free of nuclear and chemical and biological weapons. An agreement of this nature would have to include Israel and Iran as well as the Arab states. And arms limitation is in turn inextricably linked to a negotiated settlement of the political disputes of the region. In the best of circumstances, the two-fold process of political settlement and inspected, verifiable arms limitation would take several years to complete. It just might be possible to use the United Nations to buy the time and provide the stability needed to reach those agreements.

Actions for the Longer Term

The possibilities for innovative use of the UN that have opened since the end of the Cold War affect not only the immediate crisis in the Gulf but also the long-term effectiveness of the United Nations. Most important is the real prospect, for the first time since 1945, of establishing a system of standby national forces under Articles 43-45 of the UN Charter. The Gulf crisis is in some respects a case study in the possible uses of standby forces. Such forces would have enabled the UN to respond quickly with contingents that had trained together and worked out the command and control problems inherent in multinational operations. The UN would have had available to it bases, supply depots, and rights of passage that had been negotiated with UN member states under Article 43 of the Charter. The Security Council could have chosen from the standby contingents the most effective political and military mix of forces. And the costs of the operation would have been borne collectively by the UN membership, a matter likely to be of even greater concern in the future if the victim of aggression does not happen to be an oil-producing kingdom.

A critical advantage of standby forces is that they would have enabled the council to take action before, rather than after, the Iraqi invasion. Early preemptive action is often the only realistic path to preventing aggression. Yet it is a path open only to the international community, for individual states are reluctant to move forces to a threatened area when the

circumstances are ambiguous and there is no direct threat to themselves or their allies. In this instance the United States responded with extraordinary speed and force. If it had sent troops before the attack, however, it would have been ridiculed for overreacting to a situation that was generally viewed as nothing but Iraqi bluster in an oil pricing dispute. On the other hand, if standby forces had been available, the Security Council could have put on alert a UN force made up of contingents from the great powers and Arab and Islamic countries. At the same time, it might have dispatched to the region a similarly composed mediation team. There could have been no mistake in Saddam Hussein's mind about the nature of the opposition he would face in invading Kuwait.

The ability to put together a regionally and politically balanced force has other advantages as well. It gives Third World members of the United Nations a sense of shared participation and commitment, as the wide geographic distribution in traditional UN peacekeeping operations has shown. And from the standpoint of the principal contributor—more often than not the United States—it spreads the burden, undercutting domestic criticism and helping to ensure staying power over the long term.

If standby forces can in fact add to the UN's speed and flexibility in responding to aggression, there would seem to be no reason why the Security Council, working through its Military Staff Committee, should not begin now to draw up the necessary agreements. Among big and small powers alike, there has never been a better climate for the enterprise.

